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Executive Summary 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), with the goal of reforming the United States health care system and providing 
insurance for millions of uninsured citizens and residents. One component of the legislation was 
the expansion of Medicaid eligibility, which would extend to include all individuals “under age 
65 whose family income is at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty guidelines ($14,484 for 
an individual and $29,726 for a family of four in 2011)” (NCSL, 2015). This provision was 
challenged in the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that mandatory expansion was 
unconstitutional and held that Medicaid expansion must be implemented at the discretion of 
individual states. To date, 32 states, including Washington, D.C., have implemented Medicaid 
expansion; the majority of expansions became effective January 1, 2014. 
 
One predicted effect of Medicaid expansion was an increase in hospital revenues, due to an 
increase in insured individuals, a likely increase in the number of individuals seeking care, and a 
decrease in uncompensated care. The intent of this research is to determine whether this effect 
has occurred, specifically in academic medical centers and teaching hospitals. There has yet to be 
substantial research on this topic; however, several factors are presented in the literature that bear 
on the effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures. First, the occurrence of a 
crowd out effect is likely as eligibility is expanded. Some individuals already insured through a 
private insurer have become eligible for Medicaid, and may change their coverage. Thus, the 
makeup of new Medicaid enrollees is unlikely to be solely the previously uninsured, which 
would limit the expansion’s effect on hospital financial measures. Second, Medicaid programs 
often reimburse care providers at lower rates than do private insurers or Medicare. Depending on 
the size of the crowd out effect, revenues may be affected by these lower reimbursement rates.  
 
To conduct this analysis, I collected utilization and financial data from 31 academic medical 
centers and teaching hospitals in 20 states. Sixteen hospitals are located in states that expanded 
Medicaid, while the remaining 15 hospitals are located in non-expansion states. I chose a fixed 
effects model, to control for time-invariant differences between the hospitals. I estimated four 
regressions, using different financial measures as dependent variables in each model: total 
revenue, total income, operating margin, and net patient revenue. I controlled for variables that 
could influence the aforementioned financial measures, including number of discharges, case 
mix index, and payer type.  
 
The analysis found that Medicaid expansion was significantly associated with increases in total 
hospital revenue and net patient revenue, and with a decrease in operating margin. These results 
were robust to several checks. This analysis is important to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the effects of the Medicaid expansion. Furthermore, Medicaid expansion is a highly dynamic 
issue. Expansion is actively under discussion in several states, while at least one state is 
considering reforming the expansion already in effect. Political changes at the federal level may 
also lead to changes in health care legislation. Thus, it is evident that further study is critical to 
understanding the short- and long-term effects of Medicaid expansion in the United States. 
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Introduction and Background Information 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is one of the most significant 
policies to be implemented in recent years. The legislation, signed into effect on March 23, 2010, 
represents a drastic change to the American health care system in an attempt to provide insurance 
coverage for the majority of the 42 million uninsured U.S. citizens and residents (Smith & 
Medalia, 2014). The primary mechanisms by which to increase coverage are the individual 
mandate, employer requirements, expansion of public programs, and subsidies. The individual 
mandate is the requirement that all U.S. citizens and legal residents have qualifying health 
insurance. Those who fail to acquire coverage must pay a penalty, which amounts to the greater 
of 2.5 percent of taxable income or a flat fee per family member, up to a maximum of $2,085 per 
year (U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016). The employer requirements 
mandate that employers with at least 50 full-time employees provide employer-sponsored health 
insurance; if designated employers fail to do so, they also face a penalty (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013). The public program expansion refers to a significant expansion of Medicaid, 
discussed in greater detail below, as well as the requirement that the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) remains operational at its current levels for several years (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013). Finally, subsidies to be used for the purchase of health insurance were made 
available to U.S. citizens and legal immigrants whose incomes are at or below specified income 
limits, as well as to qualifying small employers for their employees’ coverage (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2013). These four components collectively attempt to ensure health insurance 
coverage for the majority of uninsured citizens and residents.   
 The Medicaid expansion is a significant, and contentious, component of the ACA. 
Provisions in the original act required expansion of Medicaid in all states to individuals “under 
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age 65 whose family income is at or below 138 percent of the federal poverty guidelines 
($14,484 for an individual and $29,726 for a family of four in 2011)” (NCSL, 2015). However, 
this provision was challenged in the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that Congress 
may not withhold state Medicaid funding on the basis of failure to comply with the Medicaid 
expansion; this effectively made the expansion voluntary for states. For states that elected to 
expand Medicaid, the federal government will pay 100 percent of the cost of newly eligible 
enrollees through the end of the 2016 calendar year; federal funding will then gradually decrease 
to 90 percent by 2020, and remain at that level thereafter (Dorn et al, 2013). This is in contrast to 
the federal medical assistance percentage of 57 percent paid for other, previously enrolled 
Medicaid beneficiaries (Dorn et al, 2013). Currently, there are 19 states in which Medicaid has 
not been expanded, and 32 states (including Washington, D.C.) in which Medicaid was expanded 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). The majority of expansions became effective on January 1, 
2014. 
The expansion of Medicaid, in conjunction with the individual mandate and other 
mechanisms to encourage widespread health insurance coverage, was hypothesized to have 
several effects. One such effect was an increase in hospital revenues as the combined result of an 
increase in insured individuals, a likely increase in the volume of individuals seeking care, and a 
decrease in uncompensated care. This analysis seeks to understand the effect of Medicaid 
expansion on hospital revenue, income, and operating margin, by comparing financial measures 
of academic medical centers and teaching hospitals in states that did and states that did not 
expand Medicaid. 
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Literature Review 
Predicted Effects on Hospital Revenues 
 Much of the literature studying the effects of the Medicaid expansion is focused on 
reductions in the number of uninsured individuals and improved health outcomes. Furthermore, 
because the Medicaid expansion has been operational for just over two years in most expansion 
states, there is a paucity of post-expansion data to be analyzed. However, the existing literature 
that makes reference to the financial implications of the Medicaid expansion for hospitals 
describes an anticipated immediate increase in revenues for hospitals.  
 The Medicaid expansion is not the only component of the ACA to have an impact on 
hospital revenues. The ACA will also decrease funding for “hospitals that serve a large number 
of Medicaid and low-income uninsured patients,” called disproportionate share hospitals, by $56 
billion between 2013 and 2022
1
 (Rudowitz, 2013; Dorn et al, 2013). Additionally, the ACA 
reduces Medicare fee-for-service payments by $260 billion (Dorn et al, 2013). An intentional 
secondary effect of the Medicaid expansion, and other aspects of the ACA, was the expected 
increase in hospital revenues to counteract these payment reductions; a predicted increase of 
$294 billion in hospital revenues between 2013 and 2022 would help to offset the 
aforementioned revenue losses (Dorn et al, 2013).  
 The increase of $294 billion is not a net estimate. The expansion of Medicaid was also 
anticipated to have a crowd out effect; as Medicaid eligibility grew to incorporate millions of 
new individuals, some would already be insured through private coverage. Because Medicaid 
                                                        
1 The disproportionate share hospital (DSH) classification is determined by a ratio that sums “the percentage 
of Medicare inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for both Medicare Part A and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), and the percentage of total inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid 
[but] not Medicare Part A” (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015). All hospitals in this study are 
classified as DSH with the exception of the hospital in Maryland; all hospitals in Maryland are excluded from 
DSH payments. 
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would provide a new, lower-cost option for insurance, some individuals would likely shift their 
coverage from private to public providers by enrolling in Medicaid. Crowd out and its effects 
will be discussed in greater detail below, but generally speaking, it is possible that hospitals 
could lose over $100 billion in private payments from individuals who switched from private 
insurance to Medicaid coverage (Dorn et al, 2013). In spite of losses due to crowd out, however, 
hospitals were still likely to generate a net increase in revenues from Medicaid; an analysis from 
the Urban Institute predicted that the net increase in total U.S. hospital revenues due to the 
Medicaid expansion would be over $180 billion (Dorn et al, 2013). 
 Another significant anticipated effect of the Medicaid expansion was a decrease in 
uncompensated care. The vast majority of uncompensated care is provided to full-year uninsured 
individuals; those lacking any insurance account for approximately 85 percent of all 
uncompensated care, whereas part-year uninsured individuals comprise the remaining 15 percent 
(Hadley et al, 2008). Uncompensated care contributes to bad debt for hospitals, resulting in 
lower net income. Therefore, a significant increase in the number of individuals with insurance, 
due to the Medicaid expansion and other aspects of the ACA, should result in lower costs related 
to uncompensated care, and thus higher net income for hospitals.  
Factors Specific to Medicaid Programs 
 There are factors inherent to Medicaid that must be considered as context for this 
analysis. First, though Medicaid is a federal program, it is administered by states. Thus, there is 
heterogeneity between state programs “in terms of enrollment procedures, demographics of the 
target population, and state politics” (Sommers & Epstein, 2010). Therefore, Medicaid will look 
different in each state that adopts the expansion, and estimates of its impact are, by necessity, 
generalizations of a great diversity of circumstances and effects.  
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 Additionally, expansion of eligibility does not invariably lead to full enrollment. Lack of 
take-up of public programs such as Medicaid is not a new phenomenon. For example, in 1997, 
only 51 percent of nonelderly adults eligible for Medicaid were enrolled (Davidoff et al, 2001). 
Furthermore, a study following the 1994-1996 Medicaid expansion that aimed to provide 
coverage to uninsured children found that 47 percent of Medicaid-eligible children were 
unenrolled (22 percent were uninsured, while an additional 25 percent were covered under 
private insurance) (Selden et al, 1998). It is likely that take-up will be higher under the ACA than 
under previous expansions, due to the individual mandate, the employer requirements, and the 
penalties associated with noncompliance; however, less than complete take-up may result in 
smaller revenue increases than were originally estimated. 
 Finally, Medicaid reimbursement rates are substantially lower than those of Medicare and 
private insurers in most states (Decker, 2007; Gruber & Simon, 2008). Because Medicaid is a 
state-run program, states have significant discretion in setting their reimbursement rates, leading 
to great variation between states. In spite of this, reimbursement at a lower rate still provides 
more income to hospitals than does uncompensated care. Yet not all new Medicaid enrollees 
were previously uninsured. The next section discusses the effect of crowd out, which will be a 
key factor in determining the extent to which hospital revenues are affected as a result of 
Medicaid expansion. 
Crowd Out 
As described above, crowd out is likely to occur when the expansion of Medicaid causes 
more people to be eligible for coverage, some of whom were previously covered under private 
insurance. Because Medicaid is a lower-cost option for coverage, some people will shift their 
coverage to Medicaid, decreasing private insurance enrollment. Crowd out is more likely to 
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occur in higher-income populations (i.e. those above the federal poverty level), because higher-
income individuals are more likely to already have private insurance coverage (Gruber & Simon, 
2008). Studies of previous insurance expansions have had mixed findings regarding the 
prevalence of crowd out. Gruber and Simon (2008) find that, in recent public insurance 
expansions, “the number of privately insured falls by about 60 percent as much as the number of 
publicly insured rises.” However, they acknowledge the propensity of similar estimates to vary 
significantly, as they are sensitive to methodology, type of data, and how crowd out and overlap 
are defined (Gruber & Simon, 2008). 
The ACA increased the eligibility of Medicaid to those with incomes at or below 138 
percent of the federal poverty level. Gruber and Simon (2008) find that "the rise in Medicaid 
coverage is largest for the group between 100 and 200 percent of poverty... [and] this is also the 
group that sees the largest decline in private coverage." This is relevant to the current analysis 
because, the greater the impact of crowd out, the less likely hospital revenues are to increase by a 
substantial margin. As discussed previously, health care covered by Medicaid is often 
reimbursed at a lower rate than care covered by Medicare or private insurance. The more 
individuals who trade their private coverage for Medicaid, the more losses in revenues are likely 
to be incurred by hospitals. This analysis will not attempt to calculate the effect of crowd out in 
the case of the ACA's Medicaid expansion; however, it is an important factor to consider when 
interpreting the results. 
Results from Early Expansions 
Five states—California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington—and 
Washington, D.C. implemented limited Medicaid expansions between passage of the ACA and 
the widespread expansion date of January 2014. Their results are instructive, considering that 
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longitudinal data from the majority of Medicaid expansion states will not be available for several 
years. Key findings are discussed below. 
 Connecticut implemented a limited Medicaid expansion in April 2010. Prior to passage 
of the ACA, "parents and caretakers with incomes up to 185 percent of the federal poverty level 
were eligible for Medicaid in Connecticut" (Nikpay et al, 2015). However, adults without 
children were only eligible for a state-based medical assistance program with limited benefits; 
further, these adults had to have incomes below 56 percent of the federal poverty level, and hold 
less than $1,000 in assets (Nikpay et al, 2015). Upon passage of the ACA, Connecticut expanded 
full Medicaid coverage to adults without children, and removed the contingency based upon 
assets (the income requirement remained the same) (Nikpay et al, 2015).  
Nikpay, Buchmueller, and Levy (2015) conducted a study to ascertain the effect of this 
expansion on Medicaid volume and uncompensated care in Connecticut. The results of their 
study find that, post-expansion, Medicaid discharges increased significantly when compared to 
the rate of change in other states (Nikpay et al, 2015). Additionally, "Medicaid revenues more 
than doubled: a relative increase of $148.5 million compared with a pre-expansion baseline of 
$135.8 million" (Nikpay et al, 2015). However, the increase does not represent a net gain for 
hospitals; approximately 56 percent of new Medicaid enrollees transferred from a different state 
health coverage program (Sommers et al, 2013). Therefore, as opposed to increasing total patient 
volume, the effect of the Medicaid expansion was mainly to change the hospital payer mix 
(Nikpay et al, 2015). Finally, uncompensated care in Connecticut neither increased nor decreased 
after the Medicaid expansion, whereas it increased significantly in other states (Nikpay et al, 
2015). Thus, these results indicate that hospitals cannot definitively expect a net increase in 
revenues as a result of Medicaid expansion. The effect on revenues will depend in large part on 
9 
the extent of crowd out and, in particular, the number of newly insured individuals compared to 
previously insured individuals who shift their coverage to Medicaid. 
Other findings from states that implemented early Medicaid expansions vary. California's 
expansion was notable in that its number of new enrollees was vastly higher than enrollees who 
transferred from existing state or local health coverage programs; 88 percent of enrollees were 
new, compared to 12 percent who transferred from other programs (Sommers et al, 2013). 
Although California expanded eligibility to incomes of up to 200 percent of the federal poverty 
level in some counties, Washington, D.C. did the same and had only 23 percent of total 
expansion enrollment comprised of new enrollees (Sommers et al, 2013).  
Thus, it is challenging to find conclusive takeaways from early state adoptions of 
Medicaid expansion. In general, however, we may make two assumptions based on the literature. 
First, it is evident that Medicaid expansion is unlikely to have a homogenous effect in all 
expansion states. Second, the Medicaid expansion's effect on hospital revenues is inexorably tied 
to other factors, such as crowd out, the effect on uncompensated care, and state program 
differences, and is thus difficult to predict in a generalizable way. 
Research Design 
 
 In this study, I investigate the question: To what extent has the Medicaid expansion 
affected hospital financial measures? The units of analysis are hospitals; more specifically, only 
not-for-profit academic medical centers and teaching hospitals are included in the analysis. 
Academic medical centers and teaching hospitals make up a critical component of the United 
States health care system. They “provide more than 40 percent of charity care, and account for 
20 percent of all hospital admissions, surgical operations, and outpatient visits” (Health Research 
Institute, 2012). They also tend to care for more high-acuity patients and patients with more 
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complex medical issues than do other hospitals (Association of American Medical Colleges, 
2014). Thus, these hospitals are integral in providing high-level care, particularly to populations 
with fewer resources, and therefore are likely to be affected by the expansion of Medicaid.   
Data Collection 
 I collected existing longitudinal (panel) data related to hospital utilization and financial 
measures for 31 hospitals in 20 states for the fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Nine of the states in 
the analysis have expanded Medicaid, while the remaining 11 have not (as of April 2016). This 
corresponds to 16 of the hospitals in the analysis being located in expansion states, and the 
remaining 15 hospitals being located in non-expansion states.  
 I acquired data from two databases. All utilization data (i.e. number of discharges per 
year, average case mix index, etc.) were retrieved from Vizient, an alliance of nonprofit 
academic medical centers and teaching hospitals in the United States. I gathered corresponding 
financial data from Modern Healthcare’s Healthcare Systems Financial Database, which collects 
quarterly and annual audited financial data for over 400 hospitals in the United States. Of the 128 
hospitals with utilization data available in the Vizient database, only 40 hospitals also had 
financial data in the Modern Healthcare database. There is no relationship between the two 
databases. Thus, hospitals that appear in both databases do so by chance and are not related in 
any way.  
I eliminated nine of the 40 hospitals because they are located in states that implemented 
limited early expansion of Medicaid (California, New Jersey, and Minnesota). This leaves 31 
hospitals in the analysis. Due to Vizient’s public disclosure guidelines, individual hospitals may 
not be identified or identifiable in this analysis. 
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Methodology 
 To conduct this study, I estimated four fixed effects regressions. Using a fixed effects 
model allows me to hold constant, or “fix,” the average institutional effects of each hospital, an 
important aspect considering the model includes 31 hospitals in 20 states, which implies variance 
at the unit level.  
 In order to draw a causal inference, there is an identifying assumption that must be made 
with the use of a fixed effects model: any unobservable factors that might affect both the 
dependent and independent variables of the model are time-invariant. It is obvious that there are 
differences between hospitals; however, I assume that these inherent differences, which might 
include the political or economic climate of the hospital's state, do not change over time. Thus, 
by controlling for said unobservable variations between hospitals, I can use the model to estimate 
the change in the variables included in the model. 
 The basic equation for the fixed effects regression is as follows: 
                   
where     is the dependent variable, or one of several hospital financial measures (see Table 2), 
with i representing entity and t representing time;   is the coefficient for each independent 
variable;     represents each independent variable;    is the entity-specific intercept for each 
hospital; and     is the error term. In this model, there are 11 independent variables. They are 
described in further detail in Table 1 below. The key independent variable is Medicaid 
expansion, which is a dummy variable that has a value of zero for hospitals in states that have 
not expanded, or for years prior to expansion, and has a value of one for years during which 
Medicaid expansion is effective. The remaining independent variables were selected based on 
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their likelihood to affect hospital financial measures. Thus, by controlling for each independent 
variable, I eliminate their ability to influence the estimate results. 
Table 1: Independent Variables 
 
Variable Type of Variable Measurement Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Medicaid expansion Dummy 0= no expansion/ 
pre-expansion;  
1= post-expansion 
Positive 
Cases (discharges) Continuous Number of cases Positive 
Mean length of stay Continuous Days Positive 
Percent of cases that go to 
intensive care unit (ICU) 
Continuous Percent of cases Positive 
Mean ICU days Continuous Days Positive 
Cases with one or more 
complications 
Continuous Number of cases Positive 
Case mix index
2
 Continuous Case mix index 
metric  
Positive 
Emergency admissions Continuous Number of 
admissions 
Positive 
% private payer Continuous Percent of cases 
with private payer 
Positive 
% Medicaid Continuous Percent of cases 
with Medicaid as 
payer 
Negative 
% Medicare Continuous Percent of cases 
with Medicare as 
payer 
Varies 
 
It is difficult to assess the financial condition of hospitals with a single measure. Therefore, I 
estimated four fixed effects regressions using different hospital financial measures as dependent 
variables: total revenue, total income, operating margin, and net patient revenue. Each dependent 
variable is described in Table 2 below. Total revenue represents all money that a hospital has 
taken in over the course of the fiscal year; in other terms, total revenue is a measure of gross 
                                                        
2 Case mix index is a metric that describes average resource intensity of a patient’s condition, i.e. how 
expensive it is to treat the patient. Patients are assigned to a diagnosis-related group (DRG) based upon their 
diagnoses. DRGs are weighted according to resource intensity; the average DRG weight for a hospital is its 
case mix index (CMI) (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.) CMIs generally range between 
approximately 0.3 and 3.4, with higher numbers indicating greater average resource intensity. 
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financial gain. The primary component of total revenue is revenue from patient care, but it may 
include other sources of revenue such as research grants, investment or capital income, gift shop 
sales, and/or donations or bequests. Income represents net financial gain, or a hospital’s surplus 
after subtracting expenses from revenue. Operating margin is a measure of profitability, which is 
calculated by dividing a hospital’s income by its total revenues. Net patient revenue measures 
revenue derived solely from patient care. Estimating the effects of Medicaid expansion on 
several financial indicators allows a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of 
Medicaid expansion on hospital financial status. 
Table 2: Dependent Variables 
Variable Type of Variable Measurement 
Total revenue Continuous Millions of dollars 
Total income Continuous Millions of dollars 
Operating margin Continuous Percent 
Net patient revenue Continuous Millions of dollars 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 In order to provide context for the interpretation of the analysis results, Table 3 presents 
summary statistics for the four dependent variables. Note that the figures are means for all 
hospitals included in the study. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Dependent 
Variable 
FY2011 
Mean 
FY2012 
Mean 
FY2013 
Mean 
FY2014 
Mean 
FY2015 
Mean 
Total revenue $1.58 billion $1.68 billion $1.78 billion $1.94 billion $1.95 billion 
Total income $105 million $114 million $117 million $158 million $216 million 
Operating 
margin 
3.16 3.73 2.88 3.63 5.45 
Net patient 
revenue 
$1.34 billion $1.48 billion $1.53 billion $1.64 billion $1.60 billion 
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Validity 
 The measurement validity of this study is clear. The analysis examines financial trends, 
which are shown directly through the variables discussed above. Additionally, the financial data 
is audited, which further strengthens its validity. Because there is not a need for proxy variables, 
or variables that are representative of other concepts, measurement validity exists inherently in 
this model.  
Causal Inference 
 In order to posit causal inference (in this case, that Medicaid expansion caused certain 
changes in hospital financial measures), two assumptions must be made: that there are no 
omitted variables, and that there is no reverse causality. Omitted variable bias occurs when a 
variable that is correlated with both the dependent variable and one or more independent 
variables is excluded from the model. There are myriad demographic, economic, and 
environmental factors that may impact hospital financial measures. However, unobservable 
variables that are time-invariant are controlled for through the fixed effects model. Additionally, 
the factors that are directly observable within a hospital that are generally known to have an 
effect on hospital financial performance, such as cases with complications, number of 
discharges, and average length of stay, are included in the model. It is possible that there are 
time-variant factors that occurred or changed over the course of time included in this study; this 
is discussed further in the Limitations section, but does not pose a strong risk to the estimates 
presented here. 
 Reverse causality describes an occurrence when the dependent variable determines the 
independent variable; here it would mean that higher hospital revenues, income, or operating 
margin caused implementation of the Medicaid expansion. Intuitively, this is unlikely. First, the 
15 
decision to expand Medicaid is made at the state level, whereas the units of analysis in this 
research design are individual hospitals. Levels of revenue or income for individual hospitals 
would not determine the decision to expand or not expand Medicaid for an entire state. Second, 
even if individual hospitals’ financial measures were indicative of average health care financial 
indicators for an entire state, it is more likely that lower hospital revenues would determine 
implementation of Medicaid expansion, due to its predicted effect of providing financial benefits 
to hospitals.  
Analysis 
The analysis shows that Medicaid expansion is significantly associated with increases in 
total revenue and net patient revenue, and with a decrease in operating margin. Table 4 presents 
estimates for the four fixed effects regressions.  
In the states included in this analysis, Medicaid expansion is associated with an average 
increase in hospital revenues of approximately $237 million and an average increase in net 
patient revenue of approximately $150 million, controlling for other factors. Medicaid expansion 
is also associated with an average decrease in operating margin of -1.26 percentage points, all 
else equal. All three estimates are statistically significant at the p < 0.1 level. There was not a 
statistically significant effect of the Medicaid expansion on total income. 
These results support the hypothesis that Medicaid expansion has a positive and 
significant effect on hospital revenue. The decline in operating margin warrants further 
commentary. As described previously, operating margin is a measure of profitability. Thus, these 
results indicate that, on average, hospitals are experiencing increased revenue, but lower 
profitability. This could be due to several factors. One is the increase in acuity of patients  
seeking medical care, thus requiring greater resources for treatment. According to a recent study 
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 Table 4: Regression Statistics 
  
of policyholders conducted by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, “people newly 
insured under the Affordable Care Act were sicker, used more medical care and had higher 
medical costs than those who already had coverage” (Pear, 2016). Another reason could be an 
increased number of individuals covered by Medicaid seeking treatment. Because Medicaid 
generally reimburses at rates lower than those of Medicare and private insurers, a shift in payer 
  Total revenue Total income 
Operating 
margin 
Net patient 
revenue 
Medicaid expansion 237.0* 71.01 -1.260* 150.1* 
 
(125.9) (54.24) (0.640) (78.32) 
Discharges 0.0234 0.0118 0.000114 0.0144 
 
(0.0181) (0.00789) (0.000120) (0.0110) 
Mean length of stay -54.94 2.020 -1.270 -166.2 
 
(207.2) (84.62) (2.180) (163.8) 
% ICU cases -7.670 -3.009 -0.00887 -9.600* 
 
(8.214) (4.231) (0.0459) (5.196) 
Mean ICU days -2.037 0.498 0.220** 1.874 
 
(6.273) (2.650) (0.0971) (4.529) 
Cases with 1+ complications 0.350*** 0.141** 0.00236*** 0.259*** 
 
(0.126) (0.0621) (0.000585) (0.0837) 
Case mix index 1,726** 91.79 -8.971 1,408** 
 
(839.2) (396.5) (6.199) (592.8) 
Emergency admissions -0.0463 -0.0234 -6.59e-05 -0.0262 
 
(0.0308) (0.0140) (0.000180) (0.0189) 
% private payer -48.07 -26.78 0.383** -12.52 
 
(36.55) (18.01) (0.186) (20.93) 
% Medicaid -20.23 -13.20 0.250** -0.679 
 
(26.14) (11.73) (0.0936) (16.11) 
% Medicare -76.09 -33.46 0.404** -25.64 
 
(48.33) (21.49) (0.163) (27.75) 
Constant 3,201 2,040* -12.44 997.6 
 
(2,364) (1,048) (9.028) (1,522) 
Observations 124 124 124 124 
Number of units 31 31 31 31 
Rho 0.917 0.825 0.944 0.952 
R-squared 0.396 0.228 0.252 0.462 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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mix to a higher percentage of patients being covered under Medicaid would likely have a 
negative effect on operating margin.  
Robustness Checks 
I took several measures to check the robustness of these results. I first corrected for issues 
related to autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity in the original models. By 
eliminating an independent variable that was causing multicollinearity, and calculating robust 
and clustered standard errors, I addressed these issues.  
I also estimated several other regressions as further robustness checks. First, I estimated 
similar regressions that used the percent change in the dependent variables between each fiscal 
year, as opposed to the dollar amounts utilized in the first regressions. The full regression table is 
presented in Appendix A. The use of percent change tends to reduce variability; while using the 
dollar amounts shows the trend across all five years, the percent change is calculated between 
each year (i.e. change from FY2011 to FY2012, then from FY2012 to FY2013, etc.) and shows 
whether the growth rate of the financial indicators is greater in hospitals located in expansion 
states.  In these regressions, only the estimate for percent change of net patient revenue was 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. The result showed that Medicaid expansion is 
associated with an average increase of seven percent in net patient revenue, all else equal. The 
lack of statistical significance of the estimates for percent change of total revenue and total 
income does not lessen their significant results in the previous regressions; it was expected that 
utilizing percent change would reduce variability and thus result in lower estimates. Therefore, 
this regression simply indicates that the growth rate of net patient revenue was statistically 
significantly higher after Medicaid expansion.  
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I performed two other robustness checks, to accommodate for a specific characteristic 
and a limitation of the data, respectively. First, while the majority of states included in this study 
expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014, three states expanded on later dates. To ensure 
that this variation did not bias the estimates, I estimated regressions without the four hospitals 
located in the late-expansion states. The full results are presented in Appendix B. The estimates 
for the effect of Medicaid expansion on the four dependent variables are similar to those 
presented in the first regressions; there are statistically significant increases in total revenue and 
net patient revenue, and a statistically significant decrease in operating margin. Additionally, the 
coefficients are marginally higher than those in the original regressions. This could be due to the 
fact that, for the hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid more recently, less time has passed 
during which an effect might be evident. Therefore, although the volume of the effect is slightly 
higher when only including hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid effective January 1, 2014, 
the effect is evident and strongly significant in both cases, and is thus robust to this change. 
Additionally, I performed a robustness check because of missing data for the 2015 fiscal 
year. This issue is discussed in further detail in the following Limitations section; in short, 
because only approximately half of the hospitals included in this study had reported their fiscal 
year 2015 financial data as of March 2016, it is important to determine whether this missing data 
impacts the results. Thus, I estimated regressions using only data from fiscal years 2011 through 
2014. The full regression results are presented in Appendix C. The results of these regressions 
show that Medicaid expansion is associated with statistically significant increases in total 
revenue and net patient revenue at the p < 0.05 level. However, in these results, the coefficients 
are marginally smaller than those in the original regressions. This is intuitive, considering that 
using data through fiscal year 2014 gives only six months of post-expansion data in the 2014 
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fiscal year, a relatively short time period from which to estimate an effect. Additionally, there is 
no significant effect on operating margin in this case, although the coefficient remains negative. 
The lack of significance could be due to the fact that, at the end of fiscal year 2014, hospitals’ 
operating expenses had not yet caught up to their utilization of resources. Thus, in general, the 
results remain robust to the issue of missing data.  
Limitations 
There are limitations to note when considering the results of this study. The most evident 
limitation is the relative paucity of data post-Medicaid expansion. The expansion was 
implemented on January 1, 2014 in most states; thus, there are, at most, data for 1.5 fiscal years 
post-expansion. Therefore, it is difficult to extrapolate a long-term trend from this data. For that 
reason, this analysis should be considered preliminary, to be supplemented by further research 
when more post-expansion data is available.  
Additionally, it is important to note that there are missing observations in the data. The 
data for all of the independent variables are complete. However, 16 hospitals have yet to report 
financial data for the 2015 fiscal year. Missing data may be classified as missing completely at 
random, in which the included data is a random sample, and thus representative, of the full data 
set; missing at random, in which the missing data is due to a factor related to a completely 
observed variable in the data set; or missing due to a factor directly related to the value of the 
variable (Pigott, 2001). The first two instances are considered ignorable; the only caveat is that 
estimates may be less precise due to the missing data, but they are still representative of the 
entire sample (Pigott, 2001). In this case, I consider the missing data to be missing completely at 
random, and thus ignorable. However, I estimated regressions identical to those in the study, but 
20 
using only data from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, as a robustness check. The results are 
discussed in the Analysis section.  
Finally, Medicaid expansion is a time-variant variable. It is possible that there are other 
factors, such as economic occurrences or implementation of other regulations, which affect the 
estimates of these models. All time-invariant variables are controlled within the fixed effects 
model, but factors that have been implemented or changed over time, such as interest rate 
fluctuations or new or changed regulations, have the potential to impact the estimates. However, 
the models have proven robust to several checks. Therefore, the estimates presented in this study 
are effective in approximating the effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures. 
Policy Implications 
 This analysis discusses the initial impact of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial 
measures. Though increasing hospital revenue was an anticipated effect of the Medicaid 
expansion, it was not a primary goal. Therefore, this study should not be considered an 
assessment of the effectiveness of Medicaid expansion, yet it is still important to understand all 
of a policy’s implications and effects. As mentioned previously, the hypothesized increase in 
hospital revenue as a result of expansion was intended to help offset other funding decreases 
written into the ACA. It is beyond the scope of this study to conjecture as to whether the revenue 
increases will fully offset the other decreases; that will be an important topic for future research. 
 It is also difficult to conjecture whether this pivotal legislation will indeed reduce health 
care spending in the United States, particularly because the legislation has initiated a vast 
number of changes in the U.S. health care system, the effects of which are yet to be fully 
understood. In this paper, I discuss both increases and decreases in federal spending on health 
care. For example, federal spending on Medicare fee-for-service payments and disproportionate 
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share hospital assistance are sharply curtailed under the ACA, yet the federal government is 
paying a much higher share of the costs for new Medicaid enrollees than it does for those 
enrolled in Medicaid prior to the ACA. Therefore, future study will be necessary to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the effects of the ACA and Medicaid expansion on federal 
health care spending. 
Conclusion 
 The expansion of Medicaid was predicted to have numerous effects, including increasing 
hospital revenue. This study shows statistically significant increases in hospitals’ revenue and net 
patient revenue and a statistically significant decrease in operating margin, all else equal, 
immediately following Medicaid expansion. This analysis provides preliminary results as to the 
effect of Medicaid expansion on hospital financial measures. However, future research will be 
instructive in determining whether these effects remain constant, increase, or decrease as more 
time passes post-expansion. 
 Additionally, Medicaid expansion continues to be a highly dynamic issue. Expansion is 
actively under discussion in several states, while at least one state is reforming the expansion 
already in effect. At the federal level, the outcome of the highly contentious 2016 presidential 
election, as well as the possibility of significant change in the composition of U.S. Congress, 
could lead to changes in health care legislation. Finally, at the end of the 2016 calendar year, 
states that expanded Medicaid will begin to pay a small percentage of the costs associated with 
the expansion and new Medicaid enrollees. It is possible that this change will affect hospital 
financial measures, as states determine how to fund their expansions. Thus, it is evident that 
further study is critical to understanding the short- and long-term effects of Medicaid expansion 
in the United States.    
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Appendix A: 
Regression Estimates Using Percent Change 
 
  
Percent 
change, total 
revenue 
Percent 
change, total 
income 
Percent change, 
operating 
margin 
Percent change, 
net patient 
revenue 
Medicaid expansion 0.0487 1.088 1.600 0.0675** 
 
(0.0478) (1.186) (0.978) (0.0300) 
Discharges 1.43e-05* 0.000132 2.79e-05 1.01e-05 
 
(7.56e-06) (0.000168) (7.25e-05) (6.16e-06) 
Mean length of stay 0.230* -1.441 -1.839 0.123 
 
(0.123) (2.071) (1.758) (0.0793) 
% ICU cases 0.00146 -0.0691 -0.0161 0.00277 
 
(0.00491) (0.0967) (0.0507) (0.00433) 
Mean ICU days 0.0116 0.104 0.0583 0.0117** 
 
(0.00754) (0.112) (0.0609) (0.00544) 
Cases with 1+ complications 0.000100* 0.00188* 0.000350 6.86e-05* 
 
(5.06e-05) (0.000934) (0.000497) (3.55e-05) 
Case mix index -0.383 -6.004 -3.500 -0.579* 
 
(0.465) (8.794) (4.411) (0.308) 
Emergency admissions -2.16e-05 -0.000244 9.34e-05 -1.17e-05 
 
(1.62e-05) (0.000339) (0.000177) (1.32e-05) 
% private payer -0.0379* -0.114 -0.0960 -0.0126 
 
(0.0187) (0.228) (0.290) (0.0144) 
% Medicaid -0.0262** -0.0293 0.225 -0.00886 
 
(0.0123) (0.121) (0.135) (0.00915) 
% Medicare -0.0492** -0.0280 0.133 -0.0306* 
 
(0.0213) (0.229) (0.187) (0.0153) 
Constant 2.540** 21.12 5.579 1.643* 
 
(1.230) (17.37) (18.63) (0.861) 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Number of units 31 31 31 31 
Rho 0.921 0.654 0.824 0.917 
R-squared 0.335 0.172 0.220 0.387 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B:  
Regression Estimates Excluding Hospitals in States that Expanded Medicaid After 
January 1, 2014 
 
  
Total 
revenue Total income 
Operating 
margin 
Net patient 
revenue 
Medicaid expansion 259.3* 86.44 -1.169* 162.3* 
 
(148.2) (63.18) (0.631) (91.43) 
Discharges 0.0211 0.0104 0.000104 0.0128 
 
(0.0183) (0.00784) (0.000115) (0.0110) 
Mean length of stay -63.20 28.37 -0.392 -170.8 
 
(223.5) (89.34) (2.094) (165.8) 
% ICU cases -10.14 -2.402 0.0234 -11.93** 
 
(7.246) (4.187) (0.0513) (4.562) 
Mean ICU days -0.561 0.564 0.232** 2.921 
 
(6.908) (3.175) (0.112) (4.637) 
Cases with 1+ complications 0.332** 0.135** 0.00244*** 0.242** 
 
(0.133) (0.0629) (0.000554) (0.0895) 
Case mix index 1,712* -23.27 -13.25** 1,415** 
 
(930.2) (431.8) (5.517) (619.0) 
Emergency admissions -0.0390 -0.0221 -6.38e-05 -0.0190 
 
(0.0311) (0.0140) (0.000175) (0.0185) 
% private payer -43.17 -25.34 0.401** -9.075 
 
(38.29) (18.86) (0.180) (21.68) 
% Medicaid -20.58 -13.49 0.259*** -1.532 
 
(26.59) (11.79) (0.0877) (16.67) 
% Medicare -71.82 -32.10 0.422** -21.46 
 
(49.13) (21.82) (0.169) (28.12) 
Constant 2,843 1,987* -11.78 659.2 
 
(2,371) (1,054) (9.641) (1,541) 
Observations 110 110 110 110 
Number of units 27 27 27 27 
Rho 0.870 0.788 0.952 0.923 
R-squared 0.406 0.228 0.294 0.496 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
Appendix C:  
Regression Estimates Using Only Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014 
 
  Total revenue Total income 
Operating 
margin 
Net patient 
revenue 
Medicaid expansion 196.3** 43.45 -0.699 143.3** 
 
(94.36) (34.08) (0.796) (66.72) 
Discharges 0.00223 0.00416 4.74e-05 -0.00132 
 
(0.0122) (0.00476) (0.000130) (0.00885) 
Mean length of stay 43.62 10.38 0.668 -41.49 
 
(209.3) (84.97) (2.494) (164.8) 
% ICU cases -2.197 -0.740 0.0222 -5.016 
 
(4.491) (2.339) (0.0550) (3.871) 
Mean ICU days -9.692 0.493 0.116 -7.128 
 
(5.853) (2.797) (0.0962) (5.635) 
Cases with 1+ complications 0.162** 0.0825*** 0.00199** 0.129** 
 
(0.0712) (0.0290) (0.000734) (0.0585) 
Case mix index 1,477** -175.0 -14.65** 1,186** 
 
(550.5) (314.3) (7.127) (558.5) 
Emergency admissions -0.00609 -0.0102 2.32e-05 0.00332 
 
(0.0227) (0.00894) (0.000204) (0.0167) 
% private payer -20.51 -3.218 0.270 -1.683 
 
(26.29) (8.359) (0.344) (19.19) 
% Medicaid -3.251 0.0518 0.0837 2.418 
 
(19.07) (6.910) (0.199) (15.11) 
% Medicare -43.12 -9.739 0.211 -13.96 
 
(29.36) (7.389) (0.230) (18.51) 
Constant 1,013 694.5 1.587 121.6 
 
(1,995) (670.2) (16.02) (1,547) 
Observations 109 109 109 109 
Number of units 31 31 31 31 
Rho 0.960 0.837 0.942 0.972 
R-squared 0.447 0.226 0.192 0.445 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 
